Indeed, his analysis of the War of 1812, specifically actions around the Great Lakes region, demonstrate the opposite. This is not to say Mahan misunderstood littoral operations. Therefore, the size of a ship is no longer the sole determinant of its power. Missiles have become the primary weapon, and those missiles are getting smaller all the time. Naval tactics are dominated more by the ability of vessels to detect and target each other (and then employ missiles or aircraft) than by the size of their cannons and sheer volume of cannon fire. The size of the ship determined the power of its punch. In his day, however, control of littoral regions, where battleships could not be easily concentrated, could not be achieved by smaller ships there was no way to place enough firepower on small craft for them to take on even an outnumbered battleship. Mahan, who made geography a major component of his theory, certainly understood this. However, geography does not always allow such a method. Mahan certainly preferred the concentration of battleships as a means to defeat the enemy’s battleship fleet (at least, in comparison to commerce raiding by smaller, faster ships), although he did not believe the principle of concentration had to be adhered to in all naval conflicts. Writing on such regions in 1902, Mahan stated, “The belligerent who, for any disadvantage of numbers, or from inferiority of strength as contrasted with the combined numbers and position of his opponent, cannot sustain his dominant hold there is already worsted.” Mahan went on to cite the balanced fleet of British Admiral Horatio Nelson at Cadiz to demonstrate controlling littoral regions during a conflict, describing the use of smaller vessels such as frigates and cutters to control the inshore waters while larger ships operated in safety further offshore. Both of these reasons remain in force today. Mahan viewed key littoral regions as decisive for many reasons, but primarily because they were the site of many advanced naval bases, essential to naval campaigns, but also because they were connected with maritime commerce. Contrary to popular belief, however, Mahan viewed a balanced fleet as one that could gain and maintain control at sea and also in the littorals. Later in the 20th Century, aircraft carriers replaced battleships. In Mahan’s time, this meant the fleet with the most battleships. When it came to fleet actions during the age of sail and steam, control of the sea tended to go to the nation with the navy that could win a fleet-on-fleet engagement. “.it is not the taking of individual ships or convoys, be they few or many, that strikes down the money power of a nation it is the possession of that overbearing power on the sea which drives the enemy’s flag from it, or allows it to appear only as a fugitive and which, by controlling the great common, closes the highways by which commerce moves to and from the enemy’s shores.” Although Mahan never used the phrase command of the sea, his description of the essence of naval warfare nonetheless describes it: Consequently, many focus on the application of that idea to so-called blue water naval strategy (i.e., fleet-versus-fleet battles on the open ocean). Mahan identified control of the sea as the key to naval strategy, and the key to achieving control of the sea was the defeat of the opponent’s fleet at sea (as opposed to targeting merchant vessels at their points of departure or arrival). Navy and Marine Corps effort to modernize littoral operations proceeds, leaders in both services would do well to return to the insights of famed naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan.

But the rapidly-changing character of naval warfare presages no revolutionary change in its nature: a contest for command of the sea and the exploitation thereof. Navy’s littoral warfighting capabilities and even restrict American access to certain waters. The effort comes none too soon, as the proliferation of advanced weaponry to various adversaries threatens to erode the U.S.

The concept is intended to drive wargaming, experimentation, analysis, and investment toward ensuring American naval dominance in littoral waters and the open ocean. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps recently signed a new concept document called Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment.

Cpt. alfred thayer mahan